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REPORT ON FIRST INTERROGATION OF

MAJOR OELJESCHLAEGER (various GAF Sigint. appointments, last on Staff of Gen. Nafue. 3 Abt.) at A.D.I.K. 2 PM 11/7/45

Addendum: Interrogation of Major BEULMANN (joined Staff of Gen. Nafue. 3 Abt. in Spring, 1945) at A.D.I.K. at 3:30 PM. 11/7/45

P/W states HOLLERITH Section of Chi - Stelle Ob. d. L was possibly overrun by the Russians: it had for some time been evacuated to BELLINCHEN, 60 kms NE of BERLIN.

Interrogator : F. P. Pickering.

TICOM
19 July45

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Introduction.

Major Franz OELJESCHLAEGER was from the beginning of the war until March 1945 in the GAF Sigint. Service. He is at present writing a report on the history of German Sigint. since before the last war. Interrogator was able to scan the first 20 pages and see that it will be a document of considerable interest. Prisoner was born on 22/9/1912 : prisoner still has to be asked what are his sources for the earlier portions of his account.

Of a number of Sigint. posts held by P/W during the war the most important is Abt. Kommandeur of III/LN Rgt 4, the Sigint. service of Luftflotte 4 (South Russian Front), Sept. '41 to Dec. '43.

Prisoner is very intelligent and cooperative. (When interrogator had already summoned the guard P/W wondered whether there was any scheme for Sigint. cover of Russian Traffics in this country. Oberst. EICK, C.O. of LN Rgt. 351 (GAF Sigint. Eastern Front), had been eager to hand over his units as going concerns to the Western Allies; his men had generally not been keen and Eick's efforts to ingratiate himself with the American Commander to whom he surrendered had not been pleasant to witness. P/W thought however there were many who would help. Interrogator allowed this to pass without comment).

General Observations.

Prisoner says that Sigint. units were the Cinderella of the GAF until the "STALINGRAD affair". III/LN. Rgt. 4 warned, and warned, that the Russians had assembled 5 Air Armies in the sector. After STALINGRAD, Sigint. was held to be the main source of Intelligence. Prisoner was a member of Oberstltn. FRIEDRICH'S staff by the time Berlin had to evacuated. He describes the move of OKL into THURINGIA as a scandal. If he had ever moved his Abteilung (III/LN. Rgt. 4) with similar lack of skill he would have been court-martialled. What was the sense, in any case, of trying to move OKL into THURINGIA?

To be stuck in Sigint. was a bad thing for a regular officer. No decorations are to be won in Sigint. When Oberstltn. FRIEDRICH applied for OELJESCHLAEGER in the Autumn of 1943 the lack of decorations was a definite obstacle. Prisoner was therefore quickly posted to the LN. Verb. Abt. of Luftflotte 4 to make up the deficiency, but before this was achieved FRIEDRICH had to summon him to POTSDAM, (July, 1941).

Details.

1. At the beginning of the war P/W was in command of W(Wetterfunk-empfangsstelle) 14 at VIENNA-HIRSCHSTAETTEN. W. 14 was the cover name for the GAF Sigint. organisation in Luftflotte 4 area. (There were similarly W10 at POTSDAM-NEUERMARSTALL, W11 at KOBBELBUDE in East Prussia, W12, location unknown, but in the West, W13 at MUNICH-OBERHACHING. All were pre-war stations, one in the area of each of the original four Luftflotten).

2. At the beginning of the Polish campaign P/W became C.O. of 7/LN. Rgt. 4 (later renamed 10/LN. Rgt. 4). As far as P/W remembers cover was restricted to P/L, of which there was enough.

3. P/W made passing reference to cover of JUGOSLAV Air traffics during the invasion of the Balkans. He was then C.C. 10/LN. Rgt. 4.

4. In Sept. 41 Prisoner became Abteilungschef of III/LN. Rgt. 4, the Sigint service of Luftflotte 4, strength about 800. First location was VINNITSA (Sep. 41). After a period of sickness he went for a time to station W2/4 at MILOCIN (Reichshof), thence to III/LN. Rgt. 4 at NIKOLAIEV. III/LN. Rgt. 4 was at MARIUPOL from June to Oct. '42, and at KISSLOVODSK from Oct. '42 to March '43

5. Asked about the relationship between III/LN. Rgt. 4 (of Lfl. 4) and the various Sigint. Companies of the Fliegerkorps in Luftflotte 4 area, P/W stated that he was empowered to advise (WEISUNGSRECHT) on the employment of the latter. No, the Corps' companies did not cover R/T only, the division of labour was pretty intricate :

> III/LN. Rgt. 4 though mainly responsible for Russian Command nets also had forward parties covering R/T. (He had tried to employ a whole company of III/4 for this purpose.)
> The Corps' Companies (9/LN. Rgt. 34, 38) intercepted some W/T.

Duplication of cover was avoided as far as possible. The Evaluation company of III/4 (14/4) collated all the incoming reports for a daily Sitrip, sent by T/P to W10 East. (Did this always go by T/P, when III/4 was well into the CAUCASUS ?). No, W/T was used for the link III/4 to Lfl. 4. When retreat began to be the normal thing, III/4 joined up with Lfl. HQ. and henceforward the W/T link dropped out.

6. III/4 was always able to cope with Russian order of battle. Continuity, through changes in units' names, was always maintained. The Russian radio bulletins devoted hours to extolling the prowess of individual Air units. If a unit, as a result of such prowess had "guards" inserted in its title (and its number altered), this was always reported openly (and, experience showed correctly) by Moscow.

7. The GAF was always quicker off the mark than the Army in identifying Russian concentrations and intended thrusts. Mobile ground forces (Tank and Mechanised corps) could sneak up to their new positions in wireless silence. But possibly three weeks before that the GAF Sigint. service would have advised Commands of significant moves of Air Force ground units. GAF was better than German Army in D/F, despite the Army's greater dependence on D/F. The Army KONAS* willingly detached D/F parties to reinforce the GAF effort. GAF was open to receive Army D/F requests.

8. Cryptanalysis

In this field there was a constant battle. III/4 in the early days took great pride in breaking Russian codes without the assistance of W10. W10 aimed at centralising cryptanalytic effort and creating a department for "new codes". W10 took away the best cryptanalysts from the Abteilung. This was hard, as old hands are better than newcomers. Obltn. WERTHER (according to P/W, now at BAD KISSINGEN) is by far the best Eastern Front Air cryptanalyst.

At III/4 they broke and read Russian Air 2 and 3-figure traffics, not 4-figure. The latter was dealt with at W10 : the breaks were passed forward.

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* Kommandeure der Nachr. Aufkl. (Army Group Sigint. Regiments)

P/W does not know anything in detail about cryptanalysis. He made a point of going to see the Evaluation Company every day and hearing the score, but how they got it was not his concern. Strength of cryptanalytic section was 1 officer and 35 men

[Regierungsrat VOEGELE is well known to P/W, but VOEGELE is a 'West' cryptanalyst of Referat E 2 (west). P/W heard that VOEGELE was ordered to KRESSBRONN (Comment: compare War Diary entry, TICOM/D-4, page 1). He heard also of a journey by lorry in the direction of MUNICH (Comment: this is probably the MURNAU story - see TICOM/I-13, p. 1, para. 2)]

P/W is a regular officer. He does not like cryptanalysts who are usually reservists. They have no sense of military discipline (VOEGELE was hopeless in this respect). They have no proper sense of responsibility, get themselves into trouble with the authorities (military or police) and, P/W would like to wager, constitute a fair proportion of the deserters.

By far the best authority on Russian Air Order of Battle is Hauptmann KUPFER, Head of Auswerte-stelle Ost. He is also very good on traffic analysis.

9. P/W was asked about the problem of route-tracking in the East. He says:

i) The Germans did no jamming in the East. There were schemes in preparation (FuG. 10).

ii) Plotting of Radar (Fu.MB activity) was not successful. The Russians used very little Radar.

iii) The forecasting of raids was extremely difficult but one developed a flair (Fingerspitzengefuehl).
Comment: there is more detail on point iii in P/W's paper in the 3 Abt. War Diary, see TICOM/D-4, p. 6.

10. P/W believes the following GAF Sigint personnel are now at BAD KISSENGEN:

Oberst EICK. CO of LN Rgt. 353 (Comment: formerly head of Funkhorchregiment WEST).
Major WINDELS. CO of II/353 (Luftflotte 6 Sigint unit)
Hptm. HEROLD. (Formerly i.c. of Sonderkommando HEROLD, Sigint Service of Fliegerfuehrer KRIM, since with Fliegerkorps I).
Obltn. CHLUBEK. Fusion officer with HEROLD'S unit.
Ltn. MUCKE. Fusion officer with WINDEL's unit.
Obltn. WERTHER. Main Eastern Front Air cryptanalyst at W10.

11. Major OELJESCHLAEGER's role when with Oberstltn. FRIEDRICH was, like that of P/W BEULMANN (See Addendum) "Bearbeitung des Einsatzes". OELJESCHLAEGER was naturally enough responsible for the East. He had always to be able to present to his chief an up-to-date picture of the work of the Eastern Regiment and was the Regiment's contact with the HQ party.

Addendum.

P/W Major Franz BEULMANN (born 23/2/1911) came into the Sigint. world at a late stage in his signals career, and was only 4 weeks in FRIEDRICH's organisation. Interrogator noted merely the following:

1) P/W was

Sept.-Nov. 1939	Signals officer at GAF Station ZIPSE-NEUDORF, SLOVAKIA.
Dec.1939-Aug.1940	with LN Abt. 38 in the West.
Aug.1940-Oct.1941	with Nafue Fliegerkorps VIII

Oct. 1941-July 1943 with Sigs. Coy. of KG 55.
Jan. 1944-Dec. 1944 with Nafue NORWEGEN

When seconded to FRIEDRICH he was first posted, for experience, to LN Rgt. 351 and was then to have gone the round of the other Sigint. Regiments to qualify for a responsible post in W/T organisation.

2) The only interesting revelation affecting Sigint. concerns the NEUER MARSTALL. Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L. occupied only the MARSTALL and adjoining hutments. The HOLLERITH Section was, towards the end of the war, no longer at the MARSTALL, but evacuated to BELLINCHEN (about 60 kms. NE of BERLIN at SQ 30). P/W knows there was some concern whether it would be overrun by the Russians and is under the impression that it did not get away.

How large?